Greg Detre
Thursday, 18 May, 2000
JAC 13.1 (1993)
Davidson � analytic philosopher � action, truth and communicative interaction
relatively unknown in composition studies + rhetoric
but indirect influence on the study of writing
via Richard Rorty � social constructionist theory
Davidson�s contribution
elaboration of a vigorously anti-foundationalist conception of language and communicative interaction
breaks with the Cartesian tradition that language = a medium of representation/expression
Rorty: Davidson�s philosophy of language =
"the first systematic treatment of language which breaks completely with the notion of language as something which can be adequate or inadequate to the world or to the self. For Davidson breaks with the notion that language is a medium - a medium either of representation or of expression."
if:
language does not mediate between us + the world
then:
no split between an inner world of thought + feeling, and outer world of objects + events
nothing exists �out there� or �in here� to serve as epistemological foundation for a theory of meaning/truth
all we have to authorize our utterances are other utterances
Rorty (in line with social constructionist theory):
"only sentences can be true . .
. and . . . human beings make truths by making languages in which to phrase
sentences."
"there is an irreducibly
social element in determining what it is that we mean."
but while many philosophers, rhetoricians, and composition theorists argue that utterances are social constructs that are convention bound
Davidson: language is not a "single repertoire of expressions--with their meanings and their semantic interpretation--which everybody shares� There is no such thing that�s shared."
attacks conceptual schemes - the idea of a shared language governed by social conventions
and so rejects the possibility that discourse communities shape and control communication and, consequently, our knowledge of the world (= a central tenet of social constructionist thought):
"there is no master key or framework theory that you can have prior to a communicative interaction or situation. You've got to work your way into the whole system at the same time."
Davidson: instead of a shared language, posits a thoroughly hermeneutical and intersubjective account of communicative interaction
emphasizes repeatedly that "communication is always incomplete. It's not as though anybody ever gets everything right. It's a matter of degree."
indeterminate + always incomplete nature of communicative interaction � requires us to think of all utterances as thoroughly intersubjective and interpersonal relations through which we acquire access to unmediated contact with other minds and objects in the world
even "our concept of objectivity . . . is an idea that we would not have if it weren't for interpersonal relations. In other words, the source of objectivity is intersubjectivity."
Intersubjectivity, in turn, is a property of individuals and not discourse communities, so, for Davidson, "understanding other cultures is no different from understanding our next door neighbor, except in degree."
"communication is always incomplete" � we have to re-examine fundamental assumptions about the nature of writing
if accept Davidson:
communicative interaction as an uncodifiable and intersubjective activity
then:
modify radically or to drop completely the central claims made both by adherents to cognitivist theory--who claim that mental processes largely define the writing act--and by adherents to social constructionist theory--who claim that writing primarily constitutes a conventional act. Moving beyond the inherent Cartesianism present in cognitivist and social constructionist theory, Davidson invites us to imagine writing as a hermeneutical interaction among language users, a conception of writing that does not require us to posit a split between a knowing subject and an imperturbable world of objects and events.
"to discover the common ground on which we can make
whatever sense we can make of one another."
---
that our knowledge is founded upon something, whether it�s information from the senses, or the contents of our own minds
2 types:
British empiricists
according to them, everything comes from the senses in one way or another and this provides a foundation for epistemology
Cartesian idea:
that what we know for certain is what is in our own minds and anything else we know we have to construct from that
3 legs to objectivity
internalism (= a Cartesian position):
the contents of our thoughts (our beliefs, desires and intentions), and what we mean by what we say
are determined wholly by what is in the head
externalism:
there are factors external to the person which are determinants of the contents of our thoughts
not just causal determinants (because that's obvious)
but, so to speak, logical determinants, too
For example, from an externalist perspective, you can't have a thought about an apple if you haven't had at some point in your life some contact--indirect or direct--with apples. So, externalism has to do with your history and things that exist outside of you that make a difference to what you can think or what you are thinking at a given moment
Davidson = an all-out externalist
he doesn�t limit the extent to which the contents of our thoughts are fixed by external objects
externalism applies universally; there are connections everywhere between the world and the contents of our thoughts. It's not limited to a few words but is true of a very large number of them
= a way of studying interpretation by purifying the situation in an artificial way. Imagine trying to understand somebody else when you have no head start: there is no translator around; there's no dictionary available; you have to work it out from scratch. It would beg the question, in trying to study the nature of interpretation, to assume that you know in advance what a person's intentions, beliefs, and desires are. I hold that you never could get a detailed picture of any of those things unless you could communicate with the person first. There is no master key or framework theory that you can have prior to a communicative interaction or situation. You've got to work your way into the whole system at the same time.
to do with what you think before and after you�ve heard the utterance
communicative interaction